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Abstract:  
I argue that capitalism presents a threat to “democratic contestation”: the egalitarian, 
socially distributed capacity to affect how, why, and whether power is used.  Markets are not 
susceptible to mechanisms of accountability, nor are they bearers of intentions in the way that 
political power-holders are.  This makes them resistant to the kind of rational, intentional 
oversight that constitutes one of democracy’s social virtues.  I identify four social costs 
associated with this problem: the vulnerability of citizens to arbitrary interference, the 
insensitivity of markets to relevant interests, failures of trust in the market system, and the 
inhibition of social deliberation about matters of public concern.  I make general two suggestions 
about how we might ameliorate these problems: First, as a way of introducing some measure of 
intentionality to large-scale patterns of business activity, the reconceptualization of such activity 
as participation in larger group actions; second, the development of deliberative bodies that bring 
together business actors, policy experts, and diverse citizens in an effort to better characterize 
and transmit the public values that business should serve. 
 
 1. Introduction 
 Whether or not capitalism is ultimately compatible with democracy, there are at least 
very powerful tensions running between these two forms of social organization.  There is a grand 
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intellectual tradition running through Aristotle, Tocqueville, Marx and many others observing 
the various ways in which economic inequalities translate into broader inequalities of social 
participation, access, and influence that present deep challenges to democracy. Capitalism also 
tends to reorder social attitudes and relationships in ways that undermine the kind of public ethos 
that democracy requires (Bowles and Gintis 1986, Dryzek 1996).  
Here I am to identify and size up a different kind of threat that capitalism presents to 
democracy, one that has not received due attention in the traditional dialectic of inequality.  I will 
argue that, independently of the concerns identified above, capitalism threatens the ideal of what 
– drawing on the work of Philip Pettit (1997, 2012) – I shall call “democratic contestation”: the 
particular manner in which democracy structures decision-making about matters of social 
significance.  Markets are by nature resistant to the kind of rational, intentional oversight that 
constitutes one of democracy’s social virtues.  As I will try to show, there are social harms 
associated with failures of this oversight even under conditions of optimal democratic equality 
and public-spiritedness.  My primary objective will therefore be diagnostic: I hope to illuminate 
the distinctive nature of the challenges we confront in reconciling capitalist markets with 
democracy.  As a secondary aim, I will make some suggestions towards the end of the paper 
about what might be involved in responding to the challenges identified. 
 
2. The Threat of Market Power 
At a minimum, the ideal of democratic governance involves the broad and equitable 
distribution of basic political powers on terms of freedom.  Following Philip Pettit’s rich work on 
republicanism (I discuss Pettit in more detail later on), my suggestion is that we can usefully 
characterize this arrangement as the institutional realization of the egalitarian social contestation 
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of power.  By contestation, I mean a process in which the contesting agents, either collectively or 
individually, have some significant capacity to affect how, why, and whether power is used 
(Pettit 1997, 2012).  By egalitarian, I mean that the relevant capacity is to be equally distributed 
to the greatest extent possible within relevant practical and moral constraints, and beyond some 
minimal threshold of sufficiency for all individuals.  So democratic contestation is egalitarian 
social contestation.  Under the right conditions, the egalitarian social contestation of power tends 
to realize the goods of freedom and equality, and that provides at least one of the core 
motivations for democratic procedures and institutional structures.   
 My central contention is that capitalism presents a threat to democratic contestation, and 
that this is something we have significant reason to worry about.  To begin, then, I’d like to bring 
into view five examples of the distinctive manner in which this threat is expressed: 
(1) The widespread, unanticipated loss of employment following the 2008 financial crisis. 
(2) The existence of “food deserts,” i.e., areas in which citizens confront significant obstacles 
to accessing healthy foods. 
(3) The fact that racial minorities in the United States are far more likely than whites to live 
close to environmental hazards (Maantay 2002). 
(4) The fact that “malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea, and tuberculosis combined constitute 21% of 
the global disease burden, but receive .31% of all health research funding” (Reiss and 
Kitcher 2009).  
(5) The fact that we continue to increase our global consumption of fossil fuels at a rapid 
pace in spite of clear evidence of its catastrophic consequences, and in spite of the fact 
that there are means readily available for significantly reducing such consumption.   
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Case (1) – the example of the 2008 financial crisis – illustrates the most obvious respect in 
which capitalist markets play a vital causal role in the determination of human welfare and its 
distribution: our wealth and opportunities rise and fall with the value of goods and services that 
the market determines.  Cases (2) and (4) both illustrate the way in which the incentives created 
by market forces frequently tend to produce gross inequalities – and inadequacies – in the 
accessibility of vital goods and services across different segments of the population.  Case (3) 
also illustrates this phenomenon, though it is complicated by the role of those who are 
disadvantaged by the phenomenon in its own creation.  The fact that racial minorities are 
disproportionately burdened by environmental hazards in the United States is in part a 
consequence of the economically motivated choices they make about where to live.  Case (5) 
illustrates the way in which the inexorable logic of capitalist markets can prove enormously 
difficult to overcome, even when it brings about outcomes that are extremely bad for everyone.   
 So these cases all illustrate, at a minimum, the vital causal role that capitalist markets 
play in morally and socially significant states of affairs.  By capitalist markets (or simply 
markets for short) I refer to systems in which goods and services are freely exchanged according 
to the norms established by some conventional notion of property rights.  But I want to suggest 
that, beyond the causal role that markets play, they also manifest through their causal role 
something very much like an exercise of power.  In the moral and political context, conceptions 
of power typically make essential reference to notions like will, goal-directedness and other 
essential tokens of human agency.1  In this respect, the sense in which markets themselves wield 
power is unclear, since markets do not have minds or manifest intentions in the way that 
                                                
1 Thus, for example, on Robert Dahl’s (1957) proposal “A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” 
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managers, political representatives, corporations, or political parties seem to manifest intentions.  
Intentions can plausibly be attributed to groups, but only under conditions in which the 
individuals who constitute them form the relevant kinds of joint intentions (Gilbert 2000). 
Markets are distinct from groups in this respect because what markets do is an unintended and, 
indeed, often unforeseen byproduct of individual actions whose intentions are directed at other 
ends.  Nonetheless, like the process of natural selection, the behavior of markets under the right 
conditions mimics intentional or goal-directed action.  This is the point of Smith’s elegant 
“invisible hand” conceit: the aggregative consequence of individuals making local decisions 
directed at their self-interest are patterns of production and distribution that are dynamically 
responsive to social aims not held in mind.  Thus, the motivation for talking about markets as 
power-wielders derives from the explanatory role of market-talk in accounting for economic 
phenomena that are (imperfectly) responsive to important social values (though the values to 
which they are responsive are not all good).  Markets reflect the as-if agency of Smith’s invisible 
hand.  In my usage, market power is constituted by the distinctive causal role that markets play 
in (a) bringing about socially significant events and states of affairs and (b) doing so in a manner 
that is dynamically responsive to at least some socially valuable aims.  
With these preliminaries out of the way, let us proceed with the primary line of argument.  
The suggestion that market power poses a distinctive threat to democratic contestation proceeds 
from two observations.  The first concerns the massive significance of market power in its 
bearing on human interests around the world, as cases (1)-(5) all illustrate.2  The increasing 
                                                
2 This statement is not intended to overlook the fact that markets also bear very significantly on 
non-human interests.  But this fact does not bear on its threat to democratic contestation, at least 
in this context. 
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globalization of markets has only made their power more significant in recent years as, for 
example, national economic and social policies are influenced by the threat of capital flight 
(Dryzek 1996), consumer behavior is shaped by the expansion of international corporations into 
new markets, and indigenous cultures confront economically driven pressures on their ability to 
sustain traditional ways of life. 
 The second observation regarding the threat of market power to democratic contestation 
concerns the peculiar nature of market power itself.  In the political context, genuine contestation 
is possible in virtue of two features of government institutions: 
(i) First, political agents and institutions are accountable.  That is, they are susceptible, 
via institutional design, to meaningful influence by those over whom they exercise 
power.  Political agents can be subjected to public evaluation and review, can be 
removed through the power of the ballot, and can be placed within a bureaucratic 
management structure that fosters meaningful (if imperfect) accountability for the 
service of public goals. 
(ii) Second, and relatedly, the operation of political agents and institutions is intentional.  
It typically reflects to some meaningful degree, the operation of goal-directed agency, 
though this is often only on the scale of a large bureaucratic organization rather than 
the individual.  The making and enforcement of laws, the operation of political 
organizations, and the movements of individual political officials are normally 
manifestations of intentions to do what is done (though this does not exclude the 
inevitability of unforeseen consequences of those actions).   
Accountability is indispensable to the prospect of contestation because the capacity to 
affect the use of political power requires some institutional mechanisms through which influence 
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is to be exercised.  Intentionality is indispensable to the prospect of contestation because 
intentionality makes possible the intelligent adjustment of activities in response to concerns and 
preferences.  Market power, however, lacks both of these properties.  Though, like intentional 
agents, markets display a dynamic sensitivity to at least some social goals, that sensitivity arises 
as a byproduct of aggregate individual intentions directed at other concerns.  Indeed the relevant 
point is even stronger than this since – on the logic of the invisible hand – the sensitivity of 
markets to social goals is at least partly dependent on the fact that the individuals involved do not 
directly aim at serving those goals.  Service of those goals is in this sense not merely a 
byproduct, but rather what Jon Elster (1983) calls an “essential byproduct.” The most significant 
consequence of this fact is that, while markets are dynamically sensitive in their behavior to 
matters of supply and demand, their as-if intentionality breaks down when considerations not 
already represented in the price signal are introduced.  Thus when markets perpetuate patterns of 
racial disadvantage, devastating environmental damage, or a catastrophic decline in the value of 
real estate, there is no apparent route to converting those concerns into modifications of market 
behavior, except by proceeding via forces (such as political regulation), external to the market’s 
operation.  
 Markets also lack accountability, or at least present important challenges to 
accountability.  They lack accountability in part as a consequence of their lack of intentionality.  
When a system is not dynamically responsive to external goals – goals not already represented in 
the normal operation of the system – the usual mechanisms of accountability with respect to 
those goals fail.  One cannot shame the market into reversing course with respect to 
environmental racism, nor can one appeal to the market by explaining why racism is morally 
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bad.  But the market’s lack of intentionality is not the only cause of its lack of accountability.  
There are two other features of markets that are relevant in this respect. 
First is a point closely related to, but distinct from, the fact that markets lack 
intentionality.  This is the fact that market behaviors are radically distributed phenomena.  They 
are vast collections of individual and smaller-group behaviors which are themselves not 
coordinated in any intentional way.  Calling markets to account therefore requires calling to 
account a vast, and vastly distributed, group of independent agents whose activities lack agency 
or responsibility with respect to the phenomena in question.  Individual firms and actors are of 
course responsible for all sorts of things within the boundaries of the market.  Companies that 
pollute the air, mistreat their workers, or create new jobs are responsible for what they do.  But 
there is no particular person or firm responsible for food deserts, environmental racism, or the 
under-representation of the developing world’s needs in the scientific research agenda.   
 In response one might note that, though firms may lack individual responsibility for the 
global distribution of scientific research efforts or the exposure of American minorities to greater 
levels of pollution, they bear responsibility for their individual contributions to these phenomena.  
I think there is some promise in this observation, and will return to pursue it later in the paper. 
But for now this point only underscores the peculiar difficulty created by the vast distribution of 
market phenomena across individual agents.  Though we can surely call individuals and 
individual firms to account for their contribution to market phenomena, creating accountability 
for the phenomena as a whole would require calling the vast, and vastly distributed set of 
individuals and firms to account in a systematic way.   
Complicating matters is once again the peculiar gap between the local goals that motivate 
individual actors and firms, and the larger-scale social consequences of the aggregation of those 
  9 
behaviors.  The primary cause of food deserts is not that grocers are biased against certain 
neighborhoods.3  They arise because grocery chain owners are trying to make money and certain 
geographic areas, for familiar reasons, tend to have difficulty sustaining profitable enterprises 
that sell healthy food.  On top of this, according to the conventional logic of market economics, a 
firm that sets aside the primary question of profit in order to address questions of social justice 
and progress will at best suffer a competitive disadvantage in the struggle for growth, capital, 
and survival.  Moreover, as the problematic history of nationalized industry suggests, attempts to 
treat public values as a priority often introduce ambiguities in managerial aims that foster 
malfeasance and incompetence (Heath and Norman 2004).  Finally, diverting one’s efforts to 
some social value other than profit can often be ineffectual or even counterproductive without 
the coordination of other actors.  Thus, for example, when musical artists set ticket prices at 
below-market rates as a token of good will towards their fans, the result is typically the creation 
of incentives for scalpers to buy those tickets and then resell them at whatever the market will 
bear for a neat profit.  The only beneficiary of the musician’s good will becomes the scalpers.   
For all of these reasons, holding individual firms accountable for their contribution to the 
realization of social values rather than profit is at best problematic.  Alleviating these problems 
would require mechanisms that hold entire industries (and perhaps even entire economies more 
broadly) accountable in a simultaneous and coordinated fashion. Later in this essay, I explore 
what that might mean.  For now, I want simply to mark this as a significant challenge for 
democratic contestation with respect to market behavior.   
                                                
3 Though, admittedly, one shouldn’t be surprised if some such bias played a role in this dynamic.  
At a minimum, the relevant point is that such bias is not the dominant causal factor in play. 
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Thus one consideration telling against the accountability of markets is the broad 
distribution of individual responsibility for market phenomena across discrete individuals and 
groups, motivated by diverse goals.  Whereas political responsibility can be attached to clearly 
identifiable individuals and groups of individuals, market responsibility seems to be born by 
everyone and no one.  A second consideration telling against market accountability concerns the 
privacy of its constitutive activities.  Systems of free exchange are defined as such in virtue of 
private property rights that protect the ability of actors to buy, sell, and use the things they own 
as they wish, though within some reasonable set of moral and legal constraints.  Such property 
rights are private only insofar as they can be exercised at the discretion of individual owners.   
To the extent that free markets are properly conceived as systems of private exchange, 
there is an obvious tension with the imperatives of accountability in both moral and institutional 
respects.  From an institutional standpoint, the privacy of property rights entails the reasonable 
entitlement, barring the violation of established legal constraints, to keep secret one’s records 
and the motivations for one’s actions.  It entails that one’s institutional obligations to publicly 
explain one’s actions and hear out objections to them are limited.  A company that illegally 
dumps toxins in a river, exploits child labor, or engages in racial discrimination violates moral 
and legal constraints and will normally incur legal punishment and moral disapprobation.  But 
failing to build a supermarket in a poor neighborhood, consuming large amounts of fossil fuel 
that one has fairly purchased, or devoting one’s research budget to pills that alleviate sexual 
dysfunction rather than the effective treatment of malaria are all activities that fail to violate 
conventional moral and legal constraints on the use of private property, and thus require no 
explanation to the public.  The legal and moral constraints that apply to markets are oriented 
principally towards the identifiable harms of individual actors within the market.  But the 
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causally significant behavior of markets, taken as a whole, is often constituted by individual 
behaviors which are themselves not causally or morally significant.   
So market power is by nature resistant to the model of accountability required by 
democratic contestation.  Such contestation, as I noted above, is premised on the existence of 
institutional mechanisms that facilitate challenges to the use of power, and an institutional ethos 
that fosters at least some measure of responsiveness to those challenges from public officials. 
Relatedly, it is premised on the exercise of genuine agency among power holders who direct 
their activities towards service of government’s characteristic aims.  Markets thus present 
additional challenges to accountability in virtue of the way in which agency is radically 
distributed across individual actors.  Market power also lacks intentionality and thus proves 
difficult to reconcile with the kind of adaptation to diverse objectives that democracy requires.   
 
3. The Distinctive Value of Contestation 
I have been arguing that markets present distinctive challenges to the ideal of democratic 
contestation.  I turn now to examine more carefully why we should regard these challenges as 
problematic.  The first step in that project is getting clear about why the ideal of social 
contestation is good in the first place, and why we should think it appropriate to extend that ideal 
to markets.   
There is of course a well-established strain of classical liberalism which holds that private 
markets are valuable precisely because they provide us with the means to manage matters of 
essential human concern without engaging in coercive interference in the lives of individuals.  In 
support of that tradition Hayek (1945) argued that, independently of any moral imperatives to 
respect private property rights, markets alone were capable of solving the epistemological 
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problems associated with efficient production and distribution on a mass scale.  Given the 
enormous range of considerations bearing on these aims, central planners lacked the means to 
gather, synthesize, and react to dynamically evolving economic conditions.  On this logic, the 
market solves problems best when left free of governmental interference. 
 Hayek’s perspective essentially supports the general argument that I have been pursuing.  
Market power is wielded in a way that is radically distributed across individual agents whose 
activities are not intentionally directed towards the net social consequences to which they 
contribute.  Making it socially contestable in the way that political decisions are socially 
contestable would seem to undermine precisely the thing that makes markets successful in 
organizing social behavior.  One hears echoes of this argument in the anti-government zeal of 
some American conservatives on economic matters.  If the government subsidizes a start-up 
industry like solar energy, for example, it is prematurely “picking winners.”  On this logic, if 
there is real social value in solar energy, then it will eventually be represented in the price signal, 
which will facilitate any needed investment.  I will shortly consider some of the problems with 
this perspective.  But the point for the moment is that, even if social contestation is a good thing 
in the context of political decisions, we should proceed carefully before making the assumption 
that it is a good thing across the board.  What is it about social contestation that is desirable, 
exactly, and why should we worry about a lack of social contestation in the economic context?  
This question must be approached from a number of different angles, which together constitute 
most of the core rationale for democracy.  
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3.1 Vulnerability to Arbitrary Interference 
In Republicanism and a series of related works, Philip Pettit defends a republican 
conception of freedom as “non-domination.”  One is dominated, on Pettit’s view, insofar as one 
may be subjected to the “arbitrary” will of another, i.e., when another has the capacity to 
interfere with one’s choices in a manner, and on terms, that one cannot control.  One is free when 
one has the capacity to contest the way in which one is subject to power, and Pettit thus 
conceptualizes democracy as a set of institutions which enable social contestation (1997, 2012).  
The conception of democracy that I employ in this paper is therefore essentially Pettit’s. 
The dialectic that Pettit employs in support of this conception of freedom is directed 
principally in opposition to the conventional liberal understanding of freedom as non-
interference.  From that point of view, we are free to the extent that our choices are not subjected 
to interference by another’s will.  Pettit observes, however, that the mere absence of actual 
interference is not sufficient to secure an attractive form of freedom. That is because the absence 
of actual interference is compatible with the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, and the capacity to 
interfere arbitrarily can, in certain domains, create forms of abject vulnerability.  Thus, whether 
or not poor, unskilled workers are able to hold on to their jobs on the basis of their merit as 
workers, they must typically live with the knowledge that, were their manager to decide to fire 
them, they would suffer extreme hardship as a result.   
This sort of dynamic is problematic in at least two ways: It is problematic, first, insofar as 
workers must bear the psychological and material costs associated with the unknown prospects 
of material privation.  The point in this case is that, even if one does not suffer from material 
privation, one must plan and act around that possibility, thus foregoing valuable opportunities 
and typically dealing with some degree of resultant anxiety.  The dynamic between unskilled 
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workers and managers is problematic, second, insofar as workers must adopt a strategy of abject 
servility in an attempt to avoid incurring the disfavor (whether appropriate or not) of their 
manager.  Under such circumstances, their agency and ability to represent themselves with 
meaningful integrity is sharply reduced, even if their manager always treats them justly.  It is the 
capacity of the manager to terminate their position without good reason, rather than the exercise 
of that capacity, which is enough to undermine an attractive form of freedom.   
 It is not hard to see how this sort of logic can be pursued to make an argument for 
democratic contestation: citizens are free to the extent that they are not subjected to the arbitrary 
will of their rulers, and arbitrariness is eliminated through procedural mechanisms and 
institutions that provide citizens with a meaningful power to participate in control over how 
political power is used (Pettit 1997, 2012).  One of the distinctive goods of social contestation, 
then, concerns its capacity to mitigate or eliminate the harms associated with being subjected to 
the arbitrary will of others.   
One of the concerns about the capacity for arbitrary interference extends to market 
power.  The other does not.  Non-domination shields individuals from the humiliating 
interpersonal dynamics associated with vulnerability to another’s will.  But since markets do not 
themselves have a will, and since they are not agents in either the corporate or personal sense, 
this concern does not appear to apply in this context.  One cannot suffer from servility to a 
market in the way that one can suffer from servility to an individual manager or firm.  This is one 
respect in which the distinction between market power and will-based notions of power is 
significant. 
 But markets do nonetheless expose individuals to the psychological and material costs 
associated with substantial uncertainty as concerns their basic interests.  As the example of the 
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2008 financial crisis illustrates, people who occupy the bottom rungs of the economic ladder are 
subject to the same kinds of economic and psychological costs as our worker confronts in the 
hypothetical case just described.  The point in that case is that the fear of such a crisis would 
itself be a significant hardship for workers, independently of its actual occurrence. Particularly in 
nations where the social safety net is weaker, the uncertainty associated with this kind of 
economic vulnerability is itself a significant material and economic hardship.  Likewise, to 
choose a different sort of example, the citizens of Bangladesh and other low lying parts of the 
world must live with a greater or lesser (these days: greater) vulnerability to extreme flooding as 
a consequence of trends in the world market for oil.  That kind of vulnerability is not only bad 
for individual citizens, it is also bad for the nation collectively in its ability to attract and 
efficiently deploy investment capital. 
 Of course, no economic or political system can comprehensively eliminate every form of 
harmful uncertainty.  Risk is a fact of life.  But some sources of risk are artifacts of human 
institutions and some are not.  Weather patterns as such are not sufficiently subject to human 
control, and are not artifacts of human institutions.  In contrast, markets are entities that we 
create, and adherence to their logic reflects choices we make about social organization.  
In any case, the point at the moment is not that we should reject markets because they introduce 
forms of uncertainty that are harmful to human flourishing.  The point is to represent this 
uncertainty as a significant cost, one that we have been able to mitigate in the domain of 
governance.  
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3.2  Insensitivity to Relevant Interests 
 There is a more obvious respect, however, in which social contestation is desirable.  As 
John Stuart Mill observed in Considerations on Representative Government (1991), the 
likelihood that the ruling class will serve the interests of the ruled is rather low except in 
circumstances where the ruled have some meaningful opportunity to give expression to their 
interests, and where there are institutional mechanisms that hold the ruling class accountable to 
them.  Social contestation, in short, is an obvious and necessary measure for ensuring that power 
is used in a way that tracks the interests of those affected by it.  There are at least two reasons for 
this.  One concerns the tendency of power-holders to serve their own interests at the expense of 
those over whom they hold power.  Social contestation provides a mechanism that at least 
mitigates this tendency by creating incentives to put the public interest first, and by creating 
mechanisms that allow for the removal of self-serving officials.  Social contestation has a 
motivational benefit in this regard.  Social contestation also has an epistemic benefit.  As Mill 
also observed, even the most benevolent dictator will be confronted by insuperable difficulties in 
gathering and assimilating the enormous body of information required to serve the interests of a 
large, diverse public (Fuerstein 2008, Mill 1991). 
 In the case of market power, there are analogs for both the epistemic and motivational 
problems that obtain in the case of political power.  From an epistemic point of view, a Hayekian 
perspective implies that the epistemological problems associated with production and 
distribution are solved – not created – via the radically distributed nature of economic activity.  
Insofar as increasing contestation requires centralizing economic decision-making in intentional 
actors, it would seem to reintroduce the very epistemological problems that markets are good at 
solving.  But one way of interpreting cases like (1)-(5) above is to point out that, while markets 
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very efficiently manage the particular variety of informational inputs that go into buying and 
selling, they are blind to a great deal of information that properly bears on the social “actions” 
that they bring about.  Markets create robust incentives for killing elephants in order to harvest 
their tusks; no one thinks this fact reveals that poaching elephants is a permissible or desirable 
social activity.  Likewise, if markets do not sustain much-needed investment in malaria research, 
that does not show that we would not do better to increase such investment.   
 Some familiar observations in this domain: though market demand reflects the existence 
of some measure of social desire for some good, desires can be founded on all manner of 
ignorance and selfishness.  At the same time, the desires reflected in price signals are reflections 
of a willingness to pay rather than all things considered judgments about desirability as such.  To 
return to the food deserts example: the fact that there is low economic demand for healthy, 
ethically sourced food in poor neighborhoods may simply reflect the fact that poor people cannot 
afford healthy, ethically sourced food, rather than the fact that they do not have a strong desire 
for such food.  Finally, as the climate change example illustrates with devastating clarity, market 
prices fail to reflect costs that arise as externalities.  In light of these observations, one way of 
understanding the failures of market power to track social interests is in terms of an epistemic 
failure.  Markets do a bad job of pooling and assimilating certain kinds of information that bear 
essentially on service of the social good.   
 The motivational problem that contestation solves in the political domain seems obscure 
in the case of market power given that, as I have repeatedly emphasized, markets lacks minds or 
intentions.  Nonetheless, it is worth bringing back into view the individual producers and 
consumers – especially large global firms – whose activities collectively constitute market 
behavior.  Milton Friedman’s (1970) famous (notorious?) suggestion that firms’ defining aim 
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should be the maximization of shareholder value captures a significant moral and organizational 
consequence associated with market behavior.  Market power effects significant social outcomes 
as a byproduct of behavior directed principally at non-social aims.  But to the extent that markets 
fail in achieving socially desirable byproducts, we ought to consider whether the asocial 
motivational structure proposed by Friedman (and captured in the invisible hand analogy) needs 
rethinking.  The social failures of markets suggest that, even if we cannot motivate markets as 
such through contestation, that we might look for ways of altering the motivations of individual 
market actors via the contestatory model.      
  
3.3  Trust in Markets 
Whereas Hobbes (1996) rejects democracy by appealing to the dangers of social 
instability associated with freedom, Locke (1988) observes that those who have the opportunity 
to authorize and control their government’s activities are far less likely to be a source of civil 
unrest.  Freedom achieves social stability, not through fear, but through mechanisms that tend to 
induce sufficient approval of social and political conditions.  Locke effectively identifies the way 
in which democratic governments succeed, not only through the primary good of fairly 
promoting citizens’ interests, but also through the secondary good of being publicly seen to fairly 
promote citizens’ interests.  In this case there is a kind of virtuous feedback loop that arises 
through the interaction among these two goods: governments that are seen to be fair and 
competent tend to enjoy benefits of approval and compliance that better facilitate the 
achievement of fairness and competence (Fuerstein 2013).  At the same time, under the right 
conditions, the superior achievement of fairness and competence should tend to promote the 
greater (justified) perception of fairness and competence.  Democratic governments achieve 
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these complementary goods, not only through egalitarian voting over representatives, but also 
through the broad spectrum of civic and political activities that allow citizens to wield some 
measure of influence over political officials.   
 Of course, one should not indulge in idealistic fantasies about the state of public 
confidence in democratic governments.  Most contemporary democracies illustrate some non-
negligible measure of distrust and disaffection towards their public institutions, for both valid 
and invalid reasons (Pharr and Putnam 2000).  The point, however, is simply to highlight the 
way in which social contestation supports at least a basic measure of confidence in political 
institutions, such that those who are on the losing end of political battles nonetheless retain the 
willingness to comply with the law and continue to fight those battles in good faith within the 
system.4 
 In the economic context, one can see a variety of contemporary manifestations of public 
alienation from capitalist institutions, most notably the Occupy Wall Street movement in the 
United States, and the sometimes violent social unrest that has accompanied Greece’s recent 
conflicts with the IMF.  While the causes of such opposition are complicated they both embody, 
not only an opposition to the way in which wealth is distributed, but also a general sense of 
distrust of capitalist institutions themselves.  While that distrust at present does not seem to 
present any real threat to the global economic order, the tendency of the capitalist system to 
serve diverse interests depends significantly on the extent to which the public is invested in its 
success.  The general belief that large capitalist actors and institutions are all corrupt and that the 
economic game is rigged threatens a kind of populist backlash that is likely to be bad both for 
                                                
4 Of course democracies are hardly immune to problems in this regard, as recent obstructionism 
in the American political system, for example, illustrates. 
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business and social progress itself.  Capitalism is far more likely to serve the full spectrum of 
social interests under conditions in which it secures the justified confidence of the public in its 
capacity to serve those interests.  Contestation serves that aim in essential ways. 
 
3.4  The Deliberative Constitution of Public Value 
 There is a familiar line of criticism extending back to Plato according to which 
democratic citizens are hopelessly incompetent on matters of public policy, and that their beliefs 
about government are vulnerable to manipulation by elites (Plato 1992, Schumpeter 1942). 
In response to such cynicism, John Dewey argued in The Public and Its Problems (1954) that 
such cynicism was the consequences of a flawed conception of democracy rather than essential 
features of the democratic public itself.  On Dewey’s view, insofar as we conceive of democracy 
principally as a matter of selecting officials to implement the public good, citizens will tend to be 
passive bystanders to the diverse factors that bear on their good.  Without some commitment to 
cultivating a refined collective conception of the public good, the basic procedural mechanisms 
of democracy will be inadequate to achieve desirable forms of self-governance.  Democracy thus 
must be understood as a “way of life” and not only a mechanism for selecting officials who will 
do the work of governance.  Specifically, it must be understood to involve a broader spectrum of 
social norms and institutions so that the public’s consciousness of its values, and the challenges 
that confront those values, can be nourished.  So democracy can be thought of as a kind of 
virtuous feedback loop, in which the values and interests that democracy serves are themselves 
positively transformed via the practice of democracy itself. 
 By way of example, consider the case of the environmental movement.  The enormous 
significance that the value of the natural environment has come to assume in policy debates is 
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essentially the consequence of 20th century moral innovations, combined with an explosion in 
relevant scientific theories.  Those moral innovations have been forged through a large-scale 
process of deliberation, one extended over several decades, about how and why the natural 
environment should be valued by human beings.  The recognition of the natural environment’s 
value has been in part a recognition of imperatives related to our own survival, but has also 
involved the transformation of human desires and goals, including our understanding of wild 
places, beauty, and our particular place in the cosmos.  In this respect the essential collective 
interest that we have in respecting the natural environment is a product of the democratic process 
in two ways: first, it is a consequence of collective inquiry that led to the recognition of the 
relationship between the natural environment and essential goods (e.g., clean water) whose value 
we already recognized; second, it is a consequence of transformations in our conception of what 
sorts of things are worth valuing, and how they should be valued.  The development of an 
environmental consciousness is also illustrative of the distinctive value of public institutions that 
facilitate vigorous, egalitarian involvement in managing affairs of common concern.  The 
development of a public environmental consciousness is a consequence in this respect of 
institutions of democratic contestation.  And the development of that consciousness, at the same 
time, is a condition that enables more effective and informed democratic governance.   
 So democratic contestation achieves the goals of public governance in part by creating 
conditions in which the animating values of public governance, and the conditions that bear on it, 
can be better identified and progressively transformed.  I have engaged in this digression on 
environmentalism in order to highlight a particular kind of problem that arises when matters of 
essential public concern – such as the distribution of scientific research funds, the availability of 
healthy food, the placement of environmental hazards, etc. – are handled and conceptualized as 
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byproducts of private activities.  When activities are conceptualized as private, they are not 
subject to procedural mechanisms that foster healthy public dialogue, and they are seen as falling 
outside the full scope of moral and legal responsibility for the service of public aims.   
One salient example of this phenomenon is the movement in the United States to 
privatize many of the most basic functions of the welfare state, including the financial security of 
the elderly (social security), access to quality healthcare, and the quality of the educational 
system.  When care for the vulnerable members of our society is conceptualized as a government 
function, responsibility for their welfare is channeled through government agents, and a public 
debate about our collective obligations to the vulnerable takes the shape of a debate about public 
policy that entails some measure of responsibility for all citizens.  When charity is a private 
function, however, the responsibility to care for the needy exists everywhere and nowhere.  
There are no particular agents to be held accountable for collective failures to serve the needy, 
and public dialogue on questions of social justice is transformed into scattered private 
conversations about how much of the family budget should go to charity.  Dewey’s insight about 
democracy, however, was that when the problems we confront are consequences of collective 
patterns of behavior, it is essential that we engage in an attempt to forge some common 
understanding of what in fact the problem is and how to approach it.   
 
4. Prospects for Ameliorating the Threat 
 I have argued that market power is distinctly resistant to the democratic model of social 
contestation and I have tried to identify some crucial problems that arise from this resistance.  
The question of how best to deal with this problem hinges on complex matters of law, economic 
policy, and institutional design that cannot be adequately addressed in the remaining space (nor 
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by the author, who lacks sufficient expertise in these areas).  I have tried to offer a diagnosis of 
some of the ills associated with contemporary capitalism that I hope might at least provide the 
basis for further inquiry.  I will nonetheless conclude by bringing into view the most notable 
analytical implications of the above, and then turning to consider in general form some 
ameliorative possibilities. 
 At the paper’s outset, I suggested that there are some widely appreciated threats that 
capitalism presents to the democratic ideal.  Capitalism threatens democracy directly and 
indirectly through its tendency to produce significant economic and social inequalities.  
Capitalism also threatens democracy by undermining the kind of public ethos that is essential to 
the healthy functioning of many democratic institutions.   
 The arguments above show that democratic contestation would be threatened by market 
power independently of these issues.  Specifically, I have argued that the incontestability of 
markets (a) subjects individuals to arbitrary effects on essential aspects of their lives, (b) reduces 
the responsiveness of large-scale social institutions to the full spectrum of essential human 
interests, (c) undermines warranted trust in economic institutions, and (d) undermines 
deliberative processes that sustain the identification and positive transformation of public values.  
In thinking about how to ameliorate the social ills associated with capitalism, we must therefore 
think structurally about its relationship to the very prospect of social choice and self-
determination, independently of matters of inequality and public-spiritedness.  
Our diagnosis of the distinctive threat that market power presents to democracy has some 
more specific implications for theoretical approaches to business ethics.  Most conceptions of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) introduce some form of obligation to the broader 
community of “stakeholders,” or individuals who are affected by commercial activities.  But 
  24 
while an adequate theory of CSR is undoubtedly essential to the amelioration of various 
problems associated with market power, the model of contestation calls for genuine mechanisms 
by which control is to be exercised, above and beyond an articulation of moral requirements.  
Thus, in discussing J.S. Mill’s rationale for democracy earlier, I noted his observation that the 
tendency of political officials to serve the interests of the public depends essentially on the extent 
to which the public has mechanisms at its disposal to create appropriate incentives and share 
relevant information.  Likewise, aligning the behavior of markets with social aims will require 
causal mechanisms that facilitate both (a) the transfer of information to firms about how their 
activities in the marketplace contribute to collective outcomes that bear on public values and (b) 
some measure of meaningful motivation to serve those values through their contribution to 
collective market activities.  So it is important that our reflection on the morality of individual 
market behavior is developed in tandem with a conception of institutional and procedural 
mechanisms that facilitate genuine friction between the public articulation of values and the 
behavior of firms participating in market activities. 
 I turn now to consider the practical implications of our discussion: what might be done 
about all of this?  Part of the answer to this question presumably involves democratically 
governed regulatory structures.  Regulatory structures are the definitive institutional device 
mediating between public expressions of value and the mass patterns of commercial activity that 
constitute market behavior.  Better realizing the ideal of contestation through those structures 
entails, on the one hand, reforms in the behavior and self-conception of the firms being regulated 
and, on the other, democratic reforms that better enable effective public oversight of market 
behavior. 
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 Regarding the behavior and self-conception of firms, I noted above that the invisible hand 
model of economic activity creates problems for the ideal of contestation.  The difficulty is that, 
to the extent that social progress is a byproduct of something else, there is no intentional 
organization linking the behavior of markets and market actors to progress.  My suggestion, then, 
is that we need to work out a conception of behavior within markets that reintroduces such 
organization.  Since markets are aggregates of individual behavior, the relevant intentions in this 
case would be some form of joint intention, i.e., intentions to contribute through one’s individual 
action to goals that are realized through the group as a whole (Gilbert 2000).  From this point of 
view, the normal profit-seeking activities of firms within the market would be justifiable just so 
long as the collective consequences of those activities can be recognized to contribute properly to 
the achievement of social goods.  This ideal is somewhat distinct from standard conceptions of 
corporate social responsibility insofar as it focuses, not on the individual consequences of 
business behavior (though one should not ignore that either), but on the way in which those 
consequences fit into broader social patterns.  Firms are to be held accountable and are to hold 
themselves accountable by reference to a broader conception of how markets serve social goals.   
As a practical matter, taking this kind of accountability seriously would entail more 
vigorous and less strategic participation in deliberative institutions that serve to articulate and 
transmit public goals.  Such deliberative institutions (I say more about this below) might include 
formal legislative and economic forums, interactions within commercial organizations and 
alliances, exchanges with shareholders, and engagement with the broader community.  The 
defining objective in such engagement would be, not the strategic pursuit of individual business 
interests but, rather, an informed conception of how those profit-seeking activities might 
contribute to broader social concerns.  One suggestive model for what business might look like 
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on these terms is the growing body of “hybrid” firms that seek explicitly to advance socially vital 
goods through profit-seeking enterprise.  Perhaps the most prominent example of this has been 
the rise of micro-credit organizations that provide small-scale loans to the poor on profitable 
terms, but there is a now a broad spectrum of organizations that employ the hybrid model in 
advancing environmental, legal, civic, medical, and other vital goods (Battilana, Lee et al. 2012, 
Mair, Battilana et al. 2012). 
Hybrids, however, do not provide the only model for the conception of profit-seekng 
activity that I have in mind.  One of the crucial obstacles to the alignment of profit-seeking 
activity with social objectives is that, as part of the conventional logic of market behavior, 
business firms tend to adopt a deliberately oppositional stance when it comes to regulation.  A 
firm committed to the ideal of collective intentionality would be pro-active in facilitating the pro-
social regulation of its own activities alongside the activities of its competitors.  An oil company 
committed to social progress might commit individually to sacrificing some measure of its own 
profits for the sake of environmental goods.  But as a participant in the collective activities of the 
market, it should endorse gasoline taxes on the presumption that they represent a shared 
commitment within the industry – and therefore a shared cost as well – to environmental goods 
that compete with profits.  Likewise a pharmaceutical company might take on the individual 
responsibility of sponsoring unprofitable research that serves the needs of the world’s poor.  But 
to conceive of itself as a participant in broader market trends would be to support policy 
measures that sustain this kind of research across the industry in a coordinated, long-term 
manner. So improving the democratic contestation of markets seems to entail the 
reconceptualization of the goals and responsibility of individual firms in a way that introduces 
some meaningful degree of collective agency to market behavior.  To the extent that firms see 
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themselves, and are seen, as intentional participants in collective endeavors, the public will be in 
a better position to bring them to account through the regulatory system.   
But the capacity of the public to wield more effective control over the behavior of 
markets also implies improvements in our civic and democratic institutions.  At present, so much 
of our economic policy is a consequence of deliberation among policy elites, subject mainly to 
contestation by organized interest groups whose principal aim is the service of narrow private 
concerns.  To the extent that the public participates in the regulation of markets, it arises too 
often via paroxysms of populist anger about high taxes, wage inequality, or overseas 
outsourcing.  While such anger is often legitimate, it tends to be at best clumsy and overreaching, 
and that is likely because of well-documented failures of public knowledge about basic economic 
ideas among other things (Caplan 2007).  
The challenge in this context is of course not unique to questions of economics.  
Scientific regulatory practice is similarly subject to populist misunderstandings about the risks 
and potential rewards associated with technological innovations.  Likewise, our policy debates 
surrounding issues such as vaccination and climate change are (particularly in the United States) 
too often overwhelmed by fallacious conceptions of scientific practice and unwarranted distrust 
of scientific institutions (Kitcher 2011, Specter 2009).  Much as these challenges suggest the 
need for a reinvigoration and reconceptualization of science education (Kitcher 2011), any 
improvement in the democratic contestation of markets is likely to entail measures that improve 
the grasp of ordinary citizens on at least the basics of economic theory and its relationship to 
policy.  But a general comprehension of economic issues will not be sufficient to improve 
democratic contestation without institutional measures that facilitate a more vigorous mutual 
exchange between the business community and the general public.  In particular, we should seek 
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expansions and improvements of deliberative forums in which the public has the opportunity to 
interact with businesses and policy makers.   
At present, a large portion of such deliberative interaction arises (in the United States 
anyway) via the communal review of specific proposed commercial endeavors, such as the 
construction of new housing developments or changes in economic zoning regulations, or tax 
breaks designed to attract new business.  A better model would afford citizens and businesses 
deliberative opportunities to assess the relationship between businesses and public values in a 
broader sense, and to think about the threats and prospects presented by more long-term 
commercial trends (Scherer and Palazzo 2007).  James Fishkin’s promising experiments with 
deliberative polling – in which citizens are convened in a carefully designed deliberative forum 
to address vital issues of public concern – provides one general rubric for this sort of thing 
(Fishkin 2009).  There are also a broad range of initiatives under way in Europe at the moment – 
such as the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence in the UK or “Publiforums” in 
Switzerland – which are designed to bring policy elites, stakeholders, and a diverse body of lay 
citizens into dialogue on public matters such as food, healthcare policy, and environmental 
policy.5  While these initiatives are still very much works in progress, they suggest a general 
framework for creating a more substantive dialogue between business firms, policy elites, and 
the public about ongoing issues of value as they arise in the economic forum.6 
                                                
5 See Hagendijk and Irwin 2006 for a useful overview of these kinds of initiatives. For an 
illuminating discussion of NICE in particular see Lever 2012. 
6 On the promise, problems, and complexity of deliberative interactions between experts and 
non-experts on technical policy matters, see Jasanoff 2005.  Jasanoff’s focus is on scientific 
policy, but there are obvious parallels with economic issues. 
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Earlier, I suggested that regulation served as a crucial intermediary between the behavior 
of the market and public expressions of value.  In this respect, it would be natural to organize the 
sorts of deliberative efforts just described around the production of government regulatory 
measures.  But it is also worth emphasizing the inevitable limitations of working through the 
government.7  Government activity is constrained by the distinctive dynamics of political 
maneuvering, bureaucratic inertia, special interest pandering, and other familiar social maladies. 
At the outset of the paper, I characterized democracy as the egalitarian social contestation of 
power.  But so long as effective contestation requires more than the conventional powers and 
procedures associated with political rights, the democratic ideal ought to encompass a broader 
spectrum of norms and institutions.  In Dewey’s words, democracy is a “way of life” in the sense 
that it entails a broad spectrum of participation in civic life that allows each citizen to realize a 
fair controlling stake in the social terms of her existence.  Although progress in labor conditions, 
gender and race relations, and the natural environment, for example, has relied in crucial respects 
on government action, such progress has been just as dependent on the mobilization of public 
opinion in other forms: consumer pressure, petitioning, journalistic exposure, and worker and 
shareholder activism, for example.  Such mechanisms provide expressions of public 
consciousness that can be effective even without government intervention, if only because they 
present a convincing threat to companies’ bottom line.   
In this respect, it is important to observe that at least some of the kinds of problems 
exemplified in cases (1)-(5) are consequences of economic disempowerment.  There presumably 
would not be food deserts, for example, if the consumers who occupied the relevant 
                                                
7 I thank David Schmidtz and the students in his Philosophy, Politics, and Economics seminar at 
the University of Arizona for helping me to see the importance of this point. 
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neighborhoods had sufficient resources to pay for healthy food.  One way of improving the 
public contestation of market power, therefore, is to pursue measures that improve the economic 
standing of those who lack sufficient resources to express their values in the marketplace.8  That 
is a form of democratization, but one that proceeds independently of political rights and duties.  
On the business side of things, ethically oriented trade bodies – such as the Fair Labor 
Association – international organizations that standardize codes of ethical conduct – such as the 
International Organization for Standardization – and the plethora of socially responsible 
investment funds now available, all provide models for mobilization apart from government 
regulation.  Though (inevitably) imperfect, such institutions illustrate what the voluntary 
cultivation of a public consciousness might look like in the business world.   
As I have already emphasized, these are only very general suggestions that require much 
more development.  And even under the most optimistic of scenarios, the implementation of 
participatory democratic initiatives is likely to introduce problems of its own.  While Dewey’s 
response to the democratic cynics was a clarion call to reinvigorate rather than abandon the 
democratic ideal, he was probably too optimistic about the consequences of sustained and 
responsible citizen engagement with the workings of policy.  In response, we must continue to 
experiment with models of institutional design and, where appropriate, consider measures that 
are less dependent on broad citizen engagement (perhaps through more elitist deliberative 
bodies, for example).     
In any case, whatever the promise of the suggestions recently put forward, it is important 
to emphasize that the problem in question, by nature, admits of no tidy or obvious solutions.  
That is, first, because the claim that failures of democratic contestation introduce significant 
                                                
8 I am grateful to Elizabeth Anderson for this point. 
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social harms does not show that democratic contestation is the sole aim which ought to guide 
social organization.  I take it for granted, at least for the present purposes of argument, that free 
markets are the overarching economic framework within which we have the greatest prospects 
for innovation, prosperity, and the creation of value in the long-term.  And I assume that there is 
no way for markets to advance those prospects without retaining some of the features that collide 
with democratic contestation.  So the question of “what to do?” with respect to contestation is 
not the question of how to comprehensively realize the democratic ideal within the economic 
domain.  It is the question of how to achieve meaningful improvements in our contestation of 
markets while preserving their distinctive capacity, under the right circumstances, to do the 
world quite a lot of good. 
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